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Executive Summary 
The U.S. Department of the Navy (DoN) 2010 acquisition workforce (AWF) 
strategic plan noted that, since the 1990s, the value of DoN contracting had 
increased by more than 50% while the acquisition workforce had declined by almost 
50%. In response, as a component of the Department of Defense (DoD), the DoN 
set an objective to in-source at least 3,500 civilian positions over the Future Years 
Defense Program period and hire an additional 1,590 civilians using funds from the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. These actions would lead to an 
increase of 8% in the civilian acquisition workforce over the subsequent six years. 
Given this increase in personnel, the following questions have been asked: What 
has been the impact of this change in acquisition staffing within the DoN, and how is 
acquisition different now than with the previous smaller workforce? Addressing these 
issues is not straightforward, due to the complex structure of both the acquisition 
workforce and of the acquisition activities themselves. 
For this first phase of our research conducted during Fiscal Year 2018, we 
performed a series of parametric, nonparametric, and nonlinear regression analyses 
to attempt to correlate the growth of the size of the Navy contracting workforce with 
the total dollar value of contracts issued and the number of contracts during the 
period of 2008 to 2017. We found that an increase in the average dollar value of 
contracts, as well as a decrease in the number of contracts, was associated with the 
growth in the contracting workforce. We also found that contract obligations fluctuate 
over time, but on average the total dollar amount of contracts is increasing. 
However, the number of contracts issued is decreasing steadily, forcing the increase 
in average contract size, defined as the average dollar amount.  
Interestingly, there is a negative relation between the total number of 
contracts and workforce size, indicating that some further analysis was required. We 
determined that 96.86% of the variation in the number of contracts can be 
determined by the time trend and workforce size. In practical terms, this indicates 
that for every full-time employee (FTE) added to the workforce, on average there is 
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an increase of 30.6 contracts after correcting for the reduction in contract size in the 
time trend (e.g., for every 100 employees added, there will be an increase of 3,064 
contracts, or a 1.8% increase in workforce size will increase the number of contracts 
by 1% on average). 
There are 13 career fields in the Navy acquisition workforce, although the 
auditing field does not currently have any employees. A potentially useful next phase 
of our work would involve carrying out the same type of analyses on these other 
career fields as was done for the contracting career field to determine any 
relationship between changes in the size of the career field’s workforce and 
contracting activity. 
Another fruitful avenue of research would be extending our work on the 
impact of the growth in the acquisition workforce to the area of program 
management, notably using the multiple databases made available through DAVE 
(Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment), a relatively recent service that 
incorporates DAMIR (Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval). The 
field of program management (PM) is much broader than contract management and 
arguably incorporates most contract management activity. Notably, PM involves 
participation by all the acquisition career fields and would have multiple measures of 
outputs and outcomes. Exploring the PM results of the growth in the acquisition 
workforce since 2008 represents an exciting avenue of future research. 
Future work will also include applying a powerful range of statistical and 
analytical modeling that may provide a reasonable indication of the impact of the 
AWF growth initiative. These modeling activities might include the following: 
a. Statistical significance comparing before-and-after effects (using two-
sample dependent T tests and F tests, ANOVA, MANOVA) 
b. Linear and nonlinear correlation matrices with statistical significance 
c. Nonlinear econometric models to identify and determine the critical 
independent variables that are statistically significant, as well as 
quantifying their impact and results of the dependent variables and 
related metrics 
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d. Creating new metrics beyond those mentioned previously, by 
collapsing multiple variables into composite measures that provide a 
more comprehensive and cohesive indication of the impact of the 
growth of the acquisition workforce 
e. Monte Carlo simulations to determine the final probability distribution 
and impact of changed manning levels. These distributions could serve 
as a benchmark for current and future metrics such as increases in 
acquisition complexity.  
A key element of future work will be separating acquisition programs into 
levels of complexity; these categorizations could then be used to predict the 
turnover, schedule risk, and cost risk of new acquisition programs. The resulting 
models could be of great use to management in assisting with the direction of PM 
activity. 
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Introduction 
The U.S. Department of the Navy (DoN) 2010 acquisition workforce (AWF) 
strategic plan noted that, since the 1990s, the value of DoN contracting had 
increased by more than 50% while the acquisition workforce had declined by almost 
50%. The cuts in workforce reflected the view then held in Congress that the 
defense acquisition workforce was too large for the acquisition budget and for the 
size of the uniformed force. Another trend had been the significant growth of 
contractor support positions, in part due to civil service hiring restrictions.  
In response, as a component of the Department of Defense (DoD), the DoN 
set an objective to in-source at least 3,500 civilian positions over the Future Years 
Defense Program period and hire an additional 1,590 civilians using funds from the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. These actions would lead to an 
increase of 8% in the civilian acquisition workforce over the subsequent six years 
(DoN, 2010; Schwartz, Francis, & O’Connor, 2016). 
Given this increase in personnel, the following questions have been asked: 
What has been the impact of this change in acquisition staffing within the DoN, and 
how is acquisition different now than with the previous smaller workforce? 
Addressing these issues is not straightforward, due to the complex structure of both 
the acquisition workforce and of the acquisition activities themselves (McKeithen, 
2016).  
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Research Context 
Research involving public-sector procurement specialists revealed that these 
professionals were “skeptical about the possibility that performance measurements 
can be useful or can increase the quality of decision-making in public procurement” 
(Diggs & Roman, 2012, as cited in Rendon, 2015). Lewis (2016) expressed some 
concerns about availability and suitability of data as well as the challenges of relating 
inputs to outputs in a professional environment.  
In a well-cited review of research into organizational performance, March and 
Sutton (1997) found that the structure and definition of performance were rarely 
explicitly justified, and that the appropriateness of performance is rarely questioned. 
Organizational performance is frequently used as a dependent variable, and 
researchers pay little attention to the complications of using such a formulation to 
characterize the behavior of organizational phenomena.  
Part of the reason for this practice is that organizational research demands 
and rewards speculations about how to improve performance. March and Sutton 
(1997) further noted that it isn’t clear that organizational purpose can be portrayed 
as unitary—a factor familiar to students of public administration—and that the 
multiple purposes of an organization aren’t reliably consistent. In addition, March 
and Sutton suggested that organizational researchers live in two worlds; one 
demands speculations about how to improve performance, while the other requires 
adherence to rigorous standards of scholarship. Finally, seeking knowledge “about 
historically ambiguous phenomena such as organizational performance is more a 
necessary form of disciplined self-flagellation than a pursuit of happiness” (March & 
Sutton, 1997, p. 705). 
Richard, Devinney, Yip, and Johnson (2009) found a limited effectiveness of 
commonly accepted measurement practices in tapping the multidimensionality of 
performance. The authors suggested that addressing these findings required 
researchers to possess a strong theoretical rationale on the nature of performance 
and to rely on strong theory as to the nature of measures. Further, Richard et al. 
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found little progress in the unquestioning assumptions about performance since 
what they termed March and Sutton’s (1997) “call to virtue.” Given the above 
research, it is difficult to contemplate how one would measure the addition of 
thousands of employees, particularly professionals doing complex work, to the 
Navy’s acquisition workforce. On the input side, one is struck by the difficulties in 
measuring who worked where at what time, as well as what they did. From the 
output perspective, the “units of work,” such as contracts, financial and other 
reporting documents, e-mails, meetings, and the like, vary significantly in size and 
importance.  
It would also be necessary to account for differences in work hours caused by 
such factors as training and leave. Measuring the productivity of military acquisition 
personnel, who make up approximately 10% of the Navy’s acquisition workforce, 
has its own set of challenges above and beyond those associated with civilian 
personnel. These include the impact of high turnover, promotions, centralized control 
over most training and development, and so on.  
Part of the challenge of determining the increase in output caused by the 
change in size of the acquisition workforce is related to data limitations. Schwartz et 
al. (2016) found significant limitations in the data available to inform acquisition 
research, particularly with respect to reliability and comprehensiveness. The Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS), which is the central database of U.S. 
government procurement, contains data with limited “utility, accuracy, and 
completeness” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2012).  
A DoD report on the performance of the defense acquisition system noted 
that defense acquisition “is complex, and each measure has its strengths and 
weaknesses, so attributing performance to a single measure is subject to the 
limitations of that measure,” and that such data, even when combined with other 
information, constitute a “crude indicator of the effectiveness of these officials’ 
decision making” (DoD, 2015, p. xv).  
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Nevertheless, it should be possible to discern some basic indicators that, 
while not definitive, do provide some indication of the impact of the increase in the 
workforce. As Gates (2009, p. 27) has suggested, 
The AW [acquisition workforce] must be viewed as an input to a 
process operation, and thought should be given to concrete 
outcomes that the workforce could be expected to influence. These 
would not be the high-level outputs of on-time, on-budget systems, 
but they could include important process-oriented outcomes that 
reflect top-flight systems engineering practices and could ultimately 
lead to improvements in the key outcomes of interest. It is also 
critical to acknowledge that the AW is engaged in a wide range of 
procurement-related activities and that different types of activities 
are likely to require separate and distinct outcome measures. 
DoN senior management has expressed the need for an improved 
understanding of measuring AWF productivity. As suggested above, one important 
caution in considering the impact of the mandated increase in the size of the AWF 
relates to traceability. Changes in the total number of employees at the DoD or DoN 
levels may not translate directly at lower levels such as individual offices. There is 
considerable fluctuation at the office level, due to normal turnover as well as directed 
changes in personnel billets that may not be related to the mandated increase in 
AWF size. Gates (2009, p. 4) commented on the challenges of measuring AWF 
productivity in the face of increasing demand for acquisition personnel: 
Key drivers of the increasing demands include the complexity of 
service contracting, which is a growing share of all government 
contracting; the fact that the number of transactions is no longer a 
good measure of workload; and the fact that best-value 
procurement approaches are substantially more complex than 
lowest-price contracting approaches. 
In addition, the methodology for counting members of the AWF is quite 
complex, and considerable data collection and analysis is required to count gains, 
losses, and switches (personnel moving into or out of the AWF to other positions). 
The extensive work performed by RAND on defining and analyzing the size and 
composition of the AWF should be used as a starting point for any analysis of the 
impact of the mandated increase in AWF to provide a common baseline of personnel 
resources (Gates, Roth, Srinivasan, & Dougherty, 2013; Powell, 2017).  
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Proposed Approach 
Within this context, it would be possible to take a limited number of variables 
that are surrogates for activity levels and compare them to AWF headcounts before 
and after the increase in workforce size. Broadly speaking, activities could be 
divided into the program and contract management realms, although it is recognized 
that these two are not mutually exclusive. Within program management, measures 
such as number, dollar amount, and program categories (ACATs) under 
management may serve as useful measures. In contract management, the number 
and total dollar value of contracts, contract processing time, and some measure of 
contract complexity, if available, would be helpful. 
One factor emphasized by Powell (2017) was the change in the composition 
of the AWF during the period of growth. For example, there were new hires from 
inside and outside the civil service with limited acquisition experience, as well as 
retiring military personnel, many of whom had a substantial acquisition background. 
It would be desirable to attempt some characterization of workforce demographics 
rather than reducing the Navy AWF to a single number in all analyses. Management 
may be particularly interested in measures of before-and-after productivity. 
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Data and Methodology 
Sources of Information 
The information required to conduct the above analyses can be grouped into 
two categories: independent and dependent variables. The dependent variables 
represent the output or outcome measures such as number of contracts issued, total 
dollars under management, and number of projects by ACAT. We are mindful of the 
comments by Gates (2009), cited above, that emphasize the need for process-
oriented measures such as desirable system engineering outcomes, rather than 
traditional output measures such as the number of contracts under management. 
We return to this issue later when we discuss dependent variables. 
In contrast, independent variables are the inputs that (plausibly) lead to the 
results characterized by the dependent variables, most notably for our study, 
workforce size and composition. 
Information about AWF size and composition is maintained on the website 
(http://www.hci.mil) of the Office of Human Capital Initiatives (HCI) within the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. For example, 
during our initial research, data on total AWF workforce size as well as numbers by 
career field (there are 13 in the AWF) are available for Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08) 
through the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17Q1), as shown in Figure 5. 
Other data available from HCI include level of educational attainment or 
certification under the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), 
years of service, and retirement eligibility. Additionally, workforce information is 
available by gender and race. Overall, the DoD AWF has increased from 125,879 in 
FY08 to 161,712 as of FY17Q1, an increase of 28%. Navy AWF personnel as of 
FY17Q1 numbered 57,268, a 39% increase since FY08. 
Dependent variables represent a significant challenge to the researcher in 
terms of availability, variety, and (perceived) relevance. These are other factors cited 
by McKernan et al. (2017), is that the contents of the information systems giving 
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access to these variables are constantly evolving due to factors such as policy and 
technology. The authors identified four public databases that provided DoD 
acquisition information: SAM, FSRS, USAspending.gov, and FPDS-NG. We 
reviewed the offerings of each system, and only the last of these appeared to 
contain relevant information for our work. 
The Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG) may 
provide some useful data for dependent variables. Established in 2005 and owned 
by the General Services Administration, this public source of information on 
contracting activity describes “who is procuring what, when, how, and from whom 
they are buying, and where the work is being done,” including spending with prime 
contractors; is used by governments, contractors, and the general public; and is 
considered authoritative (McKernan et al., 2017; Rendon & Snider, 2014). Contract 
actions are covered since FY04, and FPDS-NG allows the user to generate both 
standard and customized (ad hoc) reports. 
Another potential way of measuring AWF productivity is through financial 
information such as budget data. There may be a relationship between the number 
and type of acquisition personnel and expenditures on procurement. From the 
president’s budget, we learn that the requested total DoN procurement funds in 
FY08 were $38,718,200,000 for an AWF of 41,078 people, giving a figure of 
$942,553 procured per employee. For FY17, a procurement request of 
$49,585,801,000 and a Navy AWF of 57,278 result in an average of $865,704 per 
employee, which is only a minor decrease (DoD, 2007, 2017). 
Methodology 
We determined that an appropriate first approach would be to try to associate 
the growth in the contracting career field with levels of activity in Navy contracting. 
Specifically, we would examine the total dollars of contracts issued and number of 
contracts in FY08 and FY17 and compare these with the size of the contracting 
workforce using regression analysis.  
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There are two important limitations in conducting such work. First, the dollar 
value of a contract is not consistent with the amount of time involved in developing, 
drafting, circulating, and approving the document. Second, independent of dollar 
value, there are significant differences in contract length and complexity that also 
make the individual document a possibly problematic unit of measure for evaluating 
workload. However, we feel that dollar value and the number of contracts represent 
reasonable surrogates for total workload for the purposes of this first phase of our 
work. 
We therefore conducted a series of regression analyses to try to correlate the 
above factors. Details are provided in the appendix. Data on acquisition workforce 
size (WORKFORCE) were obtained from the Office of Human Capital Initiatives in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. The 
number of contracts issued (CONTRACTS) and the average total dollar value of 
contracts issued during the fiscal year (AVG CONTRACT SIZE) were extracted from 
FPDS-NG. The variables CONTRACTS and AVG CONTRACT SIZE were tested as 
dependent variables against WORKFORCE and TIME. 
The three variables were associated for the same given fiscal year, as well as 
for a time lag of one year to allow the increase in workforce size to take effect. In all, 
16 separate regression models were run to determine the importance of the 
relationship between the variables.  
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Results and Findings 
Our analysis of the data indicated that while the size of the Navy acquisition 
workforce in the contracting career field increased over the period 2008–2017, the 
number of contracts issued have been decreasing over time. However, the growth in 
the contracting workforce tracks with the average contract size in dollars, both of 
which are increasing over time, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Measuring Output Trends in Contract Numbers and Average Contract Size 
vs. Contracting Workforce, 2008–2017 
We also found that contract obligations fluctuate over time, but on average, 
the total dollar amount of contracts is increasing. However, the number of contracts 
issued is decreasing steadily, forcing the average contract size to increase, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Decreasing Average Contract Size, 2008–2017 
Given these trends, we set out to determine the degree of correlation 
between contracting workforce levels and total contract obligations. Linear and 
nonlinear correlations were computed, along with the statistical significance (p-
values) of the correlations—note that p-values ≤ 0.05 or 0.10 are considered 
significant. We also calculated correlation coefficients for workforce levels lagged 
one year, that is, associating the workforce levels in each fiscal year with contracting 
activity the following fiscal year to allow the impact of a change in workforce level to 
be felt. The results are shown in Figure 3, with the nonlinear, lagged correlations 
considered the most significant. 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 15 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 3: Linear and Nonlinear Correlation for Contracting Workforce, 2008–2017 
Note that the correlations increase significantly (and the p-values decrease) 
due to the introduction of the one-year lag. Interestingly, there is a negative relation 
(−0.7167) between the total number of contracts and workforce size, indicating that 
some further analysis is required. As noted previously, there also seems to be a time 
trend reduction in the number of contracts and corresponding increase in average 
contract size. 
After accounting for the time trend over the 10-year period under review, we 
found that the number of contracts is highly related to workforce size. The details are 
shown in Figure 4; 96.86% of the variation in the number of contracts can be 
determined by the time trend and workforce size, which is found to be statistically 
significant (p = 0.0259). In practical terms, this indicates that for every full-time 
employee (FTE) added to the workforce, on average there is an increase of 30.6 
contracts after correcting for contract reductions in the time trend (e.g., for every 100 
employees added, there will be an increase of 3,064 contracts, or a 1.8% increase in 
workforce size will increase the number of contracts by 1% on average). 
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Figure 4: Ranked Models Summary for Number of Contracts and Workforce Size 
As for average contract size, we found that workforce size contributes to the 
increase in average contract size over time. The average contract size for the past 
10 fiscal years is $306,866; one additional FTE contributes to an increase of $106 in 
average contract size, or 100 FTEs contribute to, on average, a 3.5% increase in 
average contract size, or $10,670 per contract. 
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Conclusions and Further Research 
Our research efforts up to this point have of necessity been exploratory. As 
mentioned previously, research in the field of professional productivity warns against 
attempts to undertake large-scale measurement efforts. However, we have begun to 
determine some basic trends from before and after the increase in Navy acquisition 
personnel, including patterns that might indicate the impact of the change in 
workforce size on organizational performance. 
The first phase of our work has examined the relationship between the growth 
of the Navy contracting workforce and the total dollar amount of contracts, and the 
number of contracts issued, from 2008 to 2017. We found that an increase in the 
average dollar value of contracts, as well as a decrease in the number of contracts, 
was associated with the growth in the contracting workforce. We also found that 
contract obligations fluctuate over time, but on average the total dollar amount of 
contracts is increasing. However, the number of contracts issued is decreasing 
steadily, forcing the average contract size to increase.  
Interestingly, there is a negative relation (−0.7167) between the total number 
of contracts and workforce size, indicating that some further analysis is required. We 
determined that 96.86% of the variation in the number of contracts can be 
determined by the time trend and workforce size. In practical terms, this indicates 
that for every full-time employee (FTE) added to the workforce, on average there is 
an increase of 30.6 contracts after correcting for the reduction in contract size in the 
time trend (e.g., for every 100 employees added, there will be an increase of 3,064 
contracts, or a 1.8% increase in workforce size will increase the number of contracts 
by 1% on average). 
As shown in Figure 5, there are 13 career fields in the Navy acquisition 
workforce, although the auditing field does not currently have any employees. A 
potentially useful next phase of our work would involve carrying out the same type of 
analyses on these other career fields as was done for the contracting career field to 
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determine any relationship between changes in the size of the career field’s 
workforce and contracting activity. 
Another fruitful avenue of research would be extending our work on the 
impact of the growth in the acquisition workforce to the area of program 
management (PM), notably using the multiple databases made available through 
DAVE (Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment), a relatively recent service that 
incorporates DAMIR (Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval). The 
discipline of PM is much broader than contract management and arguably 
incorporates most contract management activity. Notably, PM involves participation 
by all the acquisition career fields and would have multiple measures of outputs and 
outcomes. Exploring the PM results of the growth in the acquisition workforce 
represents an exciting avenue of future research. 
Future work will also include applying a powerful range of statistical and 
analytical modeling that may provide a reasonable indication of the impact of the 
AWF growth initiative as related to the other career fields and PM outputs and 
outcomes. These modeling activities might include the following (Mun, 2015): 
a. Statistical significance comparing before-and-after effects (using two-sample 
dependent T tests and F tests, ANOVA, MANOVA) 
b. Linear and nonlinear correlation matrices with statistical significance 
c. Nonlinear econometric models to identify and determine the critical 
independent variables that are statistically significant, as well as quantifying 
their impact and results of the dependent variables and related metrics 
d. Creating new metrics beyond those mentioned in the previous section by 
collapsing multiples variables into composite measures that provide a more 
comprehensive and cohesive indication of the impact of the growth of the 
acquisition workforce 
e. Monte Carlo simulations to determine the final probability distribution and 
impact of changed manning levels. These distributions could serve as a 
benchmark for current and future metrics such as increases in acquisition 
complexity.  
A key element of future work will be separating acquisition programs into 
levels of complexity; these categorizations could then be used to predict the 
turnover, schedule risk, and cost risk of new acquisition programs. The resulting 
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FY 2008 Dec 31, 2016     Change (%) 
 
    Auditing 
 
0 0 0% 
Business 
 
1792 2405 34% 
Contracting 
 
4866 5859 20% 
Engineering 
 
16353 21652 32% 
Facilities Engineering 
 
3902 5481 40% 
Information Technology 
 
800 2868 259% 
Life Cycle Logistics 
 
4104 5981 46% 
Production, Quality & Manufacturing 
 
1980 3240 64% 
Program Management  
 
3485 5514 58% 
Property Management 
 
58 64 10% 
Purchasing 
 
478 417 -13% 
Science & Technology Manager  
 
190 559 194% 
Test & Evaluation 
 
2360 3227 37% 
Unknown/Other 
 
710 1 -100% 
Total   41078 57268 39 
 
Figure 5: Department of the Navy Acquisition Workforce by Career Field 
(Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition and Sustainment], 
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Appendix 
Ranked Models Summary 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β1*WORKFORCE + β2*TIME 
C = β0 + β1 ω + β2 τ 
R2:    96.86%  
Intercept:  214201 
Coefficient:  30.6369 -14408 
P-value:   0.0259  0.0000 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β1*LN(WORKFORCE) + β2*TIME 
C = β0 + β1 LN(ω) + β2 τ 
R2:    96.79%  
Intercept:  -1139463 
Coefficient:  176726  -14359 
P-value:   0.0281  0.0000 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β1*WORKFORCEt-1 + β2*TIME 
C = β0 + β1 ωt-1 + β2 τ 
R2:    93.91%  
Coefficient:  21.0977 -13661 
P-value:   0.2054  0.0003 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β1*LN(WORKFORCEt-1) + β2*TIME 
C = β0 + β1 LN(ωt-1) + β2 τ 
R2:    93.79%  
Coefficient:  118419  -13608 
P-value:   0.2216  0.0003 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β*WORKFORCE 
C = β0 + β1 ω  
R2:    43.99%  
Coefficient:  -64.2112 
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CONTRACTS = α + β*LN(WORKFORCE) 
C = β0 + β1 LN(ω)  
R2:    43.82%  
Coefficient:  -374874 
P-value:   0.0371 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β*WORKFORCE t-1 
C = β0 + β1 ωt-1  
R2:    36.05%  
Coefficient:  -60.6375 
P-value:   0.0873 
 
CONTRACTS = α + β*LN(WORKFORCE t-1) 
C = β0 + β1 LN(ωt-1) 
R2:    36.51%  
Coefficient:  -352743 
P-value:   0.0848 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β*(WORKFORCE t-1) 
∑ = β0 + β1 LN(ωt-1) 
R2:    68.28%  
Intercept:   -315275  
Coefficient:  106.7015 
P-value:   0.0060 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β*LN (WORKFORCE t-1) 
∑ = β0 + β1 ln(ωt-1) 
R2:    66.48%  
Intercept:   -4969148  
Coefficient:  608577 
P-value:   0.0074 
 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β*WORKFORCE 
∑ = β0 + β1 ω  
R2:    49.90%  
Coefficient:  81.4716 
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AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β*LN(WORKFORCE) 
∑ = β0 + β1 LN(ω)  
R2:    48.12%  
Coefficient:  467967 
P-value:   0.0261 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β1*WORKFORCEt-1 + β2*TIME 
∑ = β0 + β1 ωt-1 + β2 τ 
R2:    78.31%  
Coefficient:  63.1889 7272 
P-value:   0.1284  0.1468 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β1*LN(WORKFORCEt-1) + β2*TIME 
∑ = β0 + β1 LN(ωt-1) + β2 τ 
R2:    77.23%  
Coefficient:  347564 7539 
P-value:   0.1523  0.1433 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β1*WORKFORCE + β2*TIME 
∑ = β0 + β1 ω + β2 τ 
R2:    68.39%  
Coefficient:  14.6540 10150 
P-value:   0.7320  0.0827 
 
AVG CONTRACT SIZE = α + β1*LN(WORKFORCE) + β2*TIME 
∑ = β0 + β1 LN(ω) + β2 τ 
R2:    68.14%  
Coefficient:  64004  10516 







Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 24 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 





Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 25 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 





Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 26 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 27 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
CONTRACTS = α + β1*WORKFORCE t-1 + β2*TIME 
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